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Abstract
While "meaning negotiation" has become an ubiquitous term, its use is often confusing. A 
negotiation problem implies not only a convenience to agree, but also diverging interest on 
what to agree upon. It implies agreement but also the possibility of (voluntary) disagreement.  
In this chapter, we look at meaning negotiation as the process through which agents starting 
from different preferred conceptual representations of an object, an event or a more complex 
entity, converge to an agreement through some communication medium. We shortly sketch 
the outline of a geometric view of meaning negotiation, based on conceptual spaces. We 
show that such view can inherit important structural elements from game theoretic models of 
bargaining – in particular, in the case when the protagonists have overlapping negotiation 
regions, we emphasize a parallel to the Nash solution in cooperative game theory. When 
acceptable solution regions of the protagonists are disjoint, we present several types of 
processes: changes in the salience of dimensions, dimensional projections and metaphorical 
space transformations. None of the latter processes are motivated by normative or rationality 
considerations, but presented as argumentation tools that we believe are used in actual 
situations of conceptual disagreement. 
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1. Introduction
"Meaning negotiation" has become an ubiquitous term, used in contexts as diverse as 
semantics and epistemology (Larson and Ludlow 1993), conversation theory (Brennan an 
Clark1996), ethnography (Wenger 1998), but also literary criticism, artificial intelligence, 
psychotherapy. The concept suggests that meaning is often not uniquely determined by the 
lexicon and ordinary utterances, and thus there is room left for a process of further 
determination through some type of interaction among communicating agents.
However, the expression “meaning negotiation” may be sometimes a source of confusion. In 
many current usages of the term, a negotiation is often confused with an agreement. 
However, a negotiation problem implies not only a convenience to agree, but also diverging 
interest on what to agree upon. It implies agreement but also the possibility of (voluntary) 
disagreement. Thus,  a problem of negotiation differs from a  problem of pure coordination, 
since while negotiators both have an interest to agree (as in coordination), they nevertheless 
have conflictual interests in dividing the value generated by their cooperation. Schelling 
(1960) has described this type of interaction as one of “mixed motives”, since common 
interest and conflict coexist in the same situation.
Robert Stalnaker has well captured the issue of “mixed motives” in his description of a 
conversation game:
"One may think of a non-defective conversation as a game where the common context set is 
the playing field and the moves are either attempts to reduce the size of the set in a certain 
ways or rejections of such moves by others. The participants have a common interest in 
reducing the size of the set, but their interests may diverge when it comes to the question of 
how it should be reduced." (Stalnaker 1999)
In this chapter, we will look at meaning negotiation as the process through which agents 
starting from different preferred conceptual representations of an object, an event or a more 
complex entity, converge to an agreement through some communication medium. The 
process is typically a sequence of offers and counter-offers that are accepted or rejected (as in 
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Clark's "contributions” (Clark and Schaefer 1989). The "solution" to the negotiation problem 
is the agreement reached (or the final disagreement).  While this approach maintains a broad 
scope, it is important to stress that it assumes that agents "move" in a defined conceptual 
space and have potentially conflicting interests in the agreement to be reached.  
There are many examples of rather ordinary communication contexts in which issues of 
meaning negotiation arise very naturally. 
A simple and powerful example has been defined by Furnas et al. (1987) as the “vocabulary 
problem”. Studying human-system interactions, Furnas et al. found that even in simple 
naming tasks individuals rarely agree ex ante on which word to use for referring to common 
objects or situations. They found that in such cases there are in general no perfect synonyms, 
and there is a low probability of ex ante lexical agreement between two different individuals 
– this difficulty of ex ante lexical agreement is also at the core of a popular computer 
interactive web game, the ESP game by von Ahn (2006)1.
As individuals do not agree ex ante on the lexical choice, and differences in their preferred 
one may actually mark subtle differences in the way they conceptualize the situation at hand, 
how do they converge on a sufficiently agreed lexicon during a conversation or other types of 
communicative interaction? Brennan and Clark (1996), in their analysis of the “vocabulary 
problem”, have submitted that this happens through “conceptual pacts” – temporary 
agreements about how the referent is conceptualized. Once such a “pact” is reached, 
individuals can repeatedly and confidently refer to an object with the same term – which 
translates into the familiar phenomenon of lexical entrainment (Garrod and Anderson, 1987; 
Brennan, 1996; Pickering and Garrod, 2004), i.e. the tendency of  people to adopt the terms 
introduced by their interlocutor within a conversation.
Brennan and Clark notice some features of conceptual pacts which are worth reporting here. 
First of all, “conceptual pacts are established by speakers and addressees jointly” (Brennan 
and Clark 1996, 149). They are the result of an interactive process that may involve different 
rounds, lexical proposals and counterproposals, and may imply also disagreement. 
Furthermore, lexical pacts are specific to a given speaker-addressee pair. In other words they 
tend to reflect the specific relation between the two and the process through which an 
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1 In the ESP game (so called because it encourages players to "think like each other"), two players randomly 
matched  through the web have to find a common (agreed) label for an image. The game has become a prototype 
for the concept of "Games with a purpose", since human participants' playfulness is used to solve problems that 
are difficult to solve in automated ways - in this case image labeling (von Ahn 2006). 
agreement has been reached – the same speaker may reach different pacts with different 
addressees. The emergence of conceptual pacts on the early stages of a conversation has been 
shown to be a good predictor of the overall cooperative success of communication (Reitter et 
al., 2007; Nenkova et al., 2008).
Another interesting example of continued negotiation of concepts, where payoffs are not just 
semantic, comes from Andersson (1994). He investigates how different meanings of “nature” 
are used and argued for by different social, political and cultural groups. For example, he 
documents the tensions in the meaning of “natural forest” between forest owners, 
environmentalists and government officials and their power struggles to establish their 
preferred meaning. The outcome of the negotiations will have economic, environmental and 
legal consequences. 
The use of vague predicates in communication provides another neat example of the 
ubiquitousness of meaning negotiation. When a vague predicate is asserted in 
communication, this often corresponds to a move that proposes to restrict the range of its 
possible values. As Barker (2002, 2013) suggests, by stating that “Harrison Ford is a tall 
actor” a speaker suggests that any actor taller than Harrison Ford is tall as well – if the 
addressee accepts this statement, all actors taller than Harrison Ford will be automatically 
annexed as tall to the common ground of the conversation. A parallel statement that “Tom 
Cruise is not a tall actor” would introduce a new restriction on the interval of tall actors, 
narrowing the range of admissible standards of tallness for actors. Of course, some of these 
statements may be rejected by an addressee – for example by rejecting the assertion that 
“Johnny Depp is tall” the addressee would signal her refusal to concede that the standard of 
tallness falls below the 1.80 m. limit.
The fact that vague predicates are intrinsically underdetermined invites their renegotiation in 
the context of each specific conversation. Through negotiation, agents can reach an 
agreement that sufficiently restricts the vague area to satisfy the coordination needs of 
communication – or decide that they cannot agree. As such, meaning negotiation contributes 
to the flexibility of vague predicates, and makes them adaptable to different contexts.
Another interesting, and more subtle, case of meaning negotiation is related to indirect speech 
(Pinker, Nowak and Lee, 2008). Indirect speech often reveals the presence of conflicting 
preferences in communication, and the need of communicating agents to negotiate through 
language the understanding of their mutual relations. Why should people often blur their 
communicative intents by allusive expressions or euphemisms? Pinker and coauthors 
suggests that, among other motivations, indirect speech reveals uncertainty about the 
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intentions of the listener, and are often first moves in a series of language manoeuvers 
allowing to explore possible agreements without incurring  the psychological (or sometimes 
material) cost of rejection. For example, a driver trying to bribe the policeman fining him 
might try a phrase such as "so maybe the best thing would be to take care of it here" (Pinker 
et al., 2008, 834), thus checking the honesty of the policeman without making an explicit 
offer that might lead to an accusation of bribery. The strategic nature of indirect speech is 
even more apparent when communication does not play only the role of transmitting 
information but also supports the negotiation of reciprocal relations between two persons (as 
in the case of an allusive sexual offer).
2. Negotiating in conceptual spaces
Conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors, 2000) provide a very natural framework for modelling 
meaning negotiation. In Warglien and Gärdenfors (2013) and Gärdenfors (2014) we develop 
an account of meaning as emerging from the interaction of different individual conceptual 
representations – as a “meeting of minds”. By taking a radical departure from traditional 
semantics, we state that the meaning of an expression does not reside in the world or (solely) 
in the mental schemes of individual users, but rather emerges from the mappings between 
individual mental spaces that are established through communication. The fundamental role 
of a communicative act, in this view, is to try to bring about cognitive changes (van Benthem, 
2008) by affecting others’ states of mind. 
The “meeting of minds” framework is couched in a geometric view where concepts are 
represented as convex regions of conceptual spaces, and the emergence of meaning is 
modelled as resulting from the mutual convergence of the positioning of each agent in the 
“product space” of their mental representations. 
A simple example of such a process, that can be used as a more general metaphor of the 
emergence of meaning from interaction, is the achievement of joint attention in children’s 
pointing (Bates, 1976; Brinck, 2004; Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2013). A meeting of minds 
occurs in pointing when child and mother perceive that, as a result of an original directional 
gesture, they are aligning their focus of attention on the same point in the surrounding 
physical space. When this convergence happens and is mutually recognized (e.g. through 
mutual gazes), the child’s picture of what he is pointing out to the mother agrees with his 
understanding of what she is attending to (the same for the mother), and a sort of 
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communicative equilibrium point is established, which can be formally modelled as a fixed 
point in the mappings between the mental spaces of the interacting agents (Warglien and 
Gärdenfors, 2013). 
The emergence of meaning in linguistic communication can be seen as a sort of generalized 
pointing process, in which language is used to drive the other’s mind in a desired direction in 
her own mental space.  A formal analysis of such communication processes shows that 
convexity of concepts plays an important role in ensuring that a “meetings of minds” exist. 
Other features of linguistic communication further support the existence of such points and 
the possibility to reach them. For example, the fact that the lexicon can express the 
categorization of an underlying conceptual space allows the use of discrete language tokens 
to approximate fixed points, while pragmatic maxims of conversation à la Grice (1989) 
facilitate convergence to such points (Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013).
However, in Warglien and Gärdenfors’s original formulation of interactive meaning, little 
attention has been paid to the role played by differences in individual preferences for a given 
conceptualization. For example, different lexical preferences applied to the same object may 
translate into different conceptualizations of that object. When two individuals referring to 
the same brick wall use “wall” and “barrier”, they may categorize differently the same visual 
scene and express a different communicative intention, reflecting different preferences for the 
scene representation (they “point” to different conceptual entities). In this case, finding a 
mutual agreement may imply some lexical give and take through which a meaning 
negotiation happens. 
In order to understand meaning negotiation, one needs to develop a notion of an individual 
commitment to some preferred representation – for example a given categorization of an 
object, a certain combination of quality features characterizing a product, or a representative 
example of a tall actor. In general, the nature of conceptual preferences can be purely 
cognitive – for example the result of the individual learning history. In other cases, it may 
reflect the value of a specific conceptualization in the light of broader utility considerations – 
for example, the interpretation of the prototypical quality of the object of exchange in a 
commercial contract (e.g. what “a workmanlike job” means in a construction contract) is 
subject to obvious conflict of interest between the two transacting parts. Furthermore, one 
needs to develop a notion of what makes it acceptable to diverge from such preferred 
representations, as well as of what will make divergence unacceptable – to the point that we 
might prefer an open disagreement. 
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A simple way to capture the essence of a meaning negotiation problem in conceptual spaces 
is to assume that individuals have preferred points in such space, and that there is a subjective 
cost in departing from a preferred point. For example, I may have my own preferred 
threshold for separating tall from non-tall actors in the dimension of height. I may be willing 
to accept departures from such threshold for the sake of conversation , but the larger the 
divergence from my own standard, the larger my discomfort. Thus, the cost of divergence 
from my favorite point will be a function of distance from such point (distance in conceptual 
spaces will express some measure of dissimilarity). And beyond a certain point, the 
discomfort caused by such divergence will offset the advantages of keeping our conversation 
running – and disagreement will break out. 
The idea can be expressed graphically in a simple way. Consider a two-dimensional 
conceptual space (e.g. the space of beer “strength”, defined by a combination of bitterness 
and alcohol degree). Let us assume that two individuals mutually engaged in communication 
share the same two-dimensional conceptual space (later we will relax this assumption), but 
have two different points defining a prototypical “strong beer”, respectively A and B. While 
both have an interest in developing their conversation, assume that the expected benefits of a 
conversational agreement are reduced by any deviation from their preferred point. If the cost 
of such deviations is an increasing function of distance from the ideal point, after a given 
distance there may be no further interest in agreeing with the other agent, and conflict will be 
preferred to concession. Thus, for each agent, the area of acceptable definitions of a strong 
beer would be a circle (Fig. 1) around respectively point A and B. The circumference of the 
circles delimit what each player can afford as the maximum acceptable distance from the 
prototype. The intersection of such circles will define a set of possible agreements – what 
both can accept as a definition of strong beer (Fig. 1a). Not all the points of the possible 
agreement set have the same status, though. Points that are outside the segment connecting A 
and B are in a strong sense (Pareto) inefficient: agents can improve their position without 
damaging the other by coming closer to such segment. Thus, the bold segment (a,b) will 
define the efficient agreement set, where agreements should be expected to fall (Fig. 1b). 
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Figure 1 - Acceptable and effcient agreements
While this powerfully restricts the set of agreements one is expected to observe, it leaves still 
indetermined the problem of which agreement should prevail. Game theorists have provided 
a large repertoire of solution concepts for situations such as the one described above. One 
solution that most naturally fits communication contexts however pre-dates game theory – 
Zeuthen’s (1930) approach to bilateral bargaining. Zeuthen’s idea can be simply summarized 
by a key question: at each stage of a bargaining process, who should make a concession? The 
outcome of a bargaining problem will depend from the progressive contraction of the 
bargaining space as a result of subsequent concessions. 
Imagine a situation like the one depicted in fig. 2. The possible agreements set is not empty, 
thus a solution to the meaning negotiation problem may be expected. Mary and Joe have both 
made initial proposals M1 and J1 that fall within the agreement set, but leave room for further 
negotiation. For example, Mary could accept Joe’s offer (after all it’s in the acceptable set), 
but of course her own proposal is more convenient to her. Its not clear, though, that Joe could 
accept Mary’s proposal, so Mary could be tempted to make a concession by proposing, for 
example, M2. Similarly, Joe has to decide whether to stay on his own proposal – at the risk of 
triggering a conflict with Mary – or make in turn a concession, say J2. 
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 Figure 2  - Moves in the bargaining process
   
 
Zeuthen’s key assumption is that at each turn Mary (Joe) will evaluate the situation, and 
assess what is the maximum acceptable risk that Joe (Mary) will prefer the conflict rather 
than accept M1 (J1). The intuition is that the one who has the lowest acceptable risk will 
concede. In other words, those that can afford a larger risk have an advantage. An important 
implication is that if agents are symmetric (same cost of conflict, same risk aversion) the 
solution will be an even split along the efficient agreements line. Otherwise, players enjoying 
a comparatively lower conflict cost and having higher propensity to risk will be more willing 
to engage in conflict and thus have higher bargaining power.
The idea that players more willing to face conflict have an advantage seems empirically 
reasonable also in the communication domain – and indeed experimental data on how 
individuals negotiate a language can support such claim. For example, Selten and Warglien's 
(2007) experiment on the emergence of a common (artificial) lexicon in a two-person 
language game of referring shows that players signaling their stubborness in the early stages 
of the game have a decisive advantage in imposing their own preferred code for referring to a 
set of objects. Brennan’s (1996) study on lexical entrainment in man-machine interaction 
shows that individuals having a conversation with a computer dialogue interface tend to 
concede to the lexicon of the (credibly stubborn) machine.
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Under the further assumption that individuals act according to expected utility, Zeuthen’s 
mechanism leads to a well-known solution concept in cooperative game theory, the Nash 
bargaining solution (Harsanyi, 1956).2 While we will not go into the details of such solution 
concept in this chapter, it is worth noting that the same topological properties (compactness 
and convexity) of conceptual spaces that support “meetings of minds” (Warglien and 
Gärdenfors, 2013) support the existence and uniqueness of the Nash solution. 
This view of meaning negotiation crucially depends on the fact that some intial representation 
is established for each agent, and that agents can locate their meanings in such space. It may 
be questioned that it is always possible to open up new dimensions in a negotiation. 
However, since concepts have an "open texture" (Porosität) (Waismann 1968), there is always 
some new aspect of a concept that has not been captured by the negotiation. Waismann 
argues that concepts (outside mathematics) can never be given a complete definition in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions: "[T]here will always remain a possibiility ... that we 
have not taken into account something or other that may be relevant to their usage. ... I shall 
never reach a point where my description will be completed" (1968, p. 121-122). Broader 
situations in which meaning has to be jointly elaborated through a process of search of 
relevant dimensions (see Egré 2013) may lay outside the scope of our use of "meaning 
negotiation"
3. Variations
Different assumptions may lead to slightly different ways of determining the equilibrium 
solution (Thomson 1994) – and the fact that in many cases language is discrete may lead 
anyway to just approximations of such solutions (Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013). Equilibira 
solutions are motivated by normative considerations. However, there are also other 
argumentation tools that may be involved in reaching an agreement or a partial agreement in 
a negotiation. In this section we present some tools of this kind. 
Interesting implications can be derived by assuming some form of bounded rationality, that 
may limit the ability of agents to have a full rational control of all the space of 
representations. For example, many conversational phenomena appear to be driven by 
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2 The Nash solution predicts that players will jointy maximize the product of their utilities. The Nash solution 
shoud not  be confounded with the concept of Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium and the Nash solution to 
the bargaining problem belong to two different families of game theoretic solutions, the former being a non-
cooperative games solution concept, the latter a cooperative games one: see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for 
an accessible introduction to both. For example, the Nash solution assumes Pareto-efficiency as an axiom, while 
Nash equilibria can be non Pareto-efficient.
automatic processes rather than deliberation (Pickering and Garrod 2004). Also, it has been 
shown that the choice of the reference word in lexical comparison can alter the salience of 
properties of given objects affecting similarity judgments (Ortony et al. 1985). In these cases, 
the effects of changes (or manipulations) of representations can be considered, that can 
substantially affect the outcome of meaning negotiation. 
3.1 Salience manipulation. 
Consider a case such as is depicted in figure 3. The distance (conceptual dissimilarity) 
between the preferred points C and D is such that it overrides the benefits of cooperation, and 
lack of agreement should be expected. However, the distance between such points depends 
on how the two dimensions are weighted – something that will depend crucially from the 
salience attributed on each dimension (Gärdenfors, 2000). Appropriate manipulation of the 
salience of different dimensions can modify the perception of dissimilarity between two 
agents (Ortony et al., 1985) and modify the distance between the two preferred points, thus 
facilitating the emergence of a possible agreement area (see figure 3). It is well known that 
salience effects can be manipulated in conversation and affect perceptions in automatic, hard-
to-control ways (Taylor et al. 1979). For example, a speaker may exploit the priming effects 
of mentioning some words early in the conversation to make the dimensions associated to 
such words more relevant through entrainment, a mostly automatic process (Pickering and 
Garrod, 2004). 
        
       Figure 3 - Agreements are made possible as the weight of the abscissa is reduced
3.2 Partial agreements
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The use of semantically underdeterminate words is frequent in language (Ludlow, to appear). 
While in some cases it can be related to simple reasons of economy, e.g. when a more 
determinate description is not needed, some level of indeterminacy may be related to the 
search for a partial agreement when a full one is not reachable. Typically, a partial agreement 
will consider only some dimensions of the problem, ignoring or deferring other ones. For 
example, as concepts can have multiple quality dimensions but adjectives typically represent 
only single or integral (non-separable) attributes (Gärdenfors 2000, 2014), a conversation 
focusing on a specific adjective will implicitly foster partial lexical pacts. 
 
   Figure 4 - Partial agreement areas on projections
Once more, conceptual spaces suggest a natural analysis of such a phenomenon. Consider 
again two individuals with apparently incompatible conceptualizations, such that the circles 
representing their area of acceptable meanings do not overlap (fig. 4). Despite the global 
incompatibility of their concepts, they still can agree on the projections of the circles on the 
single conceptual dimensions x or y (the xc and yc segments in fig. 4). Thus, there is room for 
at least a partial agreement on each dimension. One classical example is the separation of 
disagreement on facts from disagreement on values, the former being often easier to solve 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958/1969). On a micro-level, conversational templates such 
as the proverbial "It doesn't matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice" 
provide an obvious template for partial agreements.
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Of course, which dimension prevails might create some advantage for one of the two 
speakers, which implies that there is ample room for different forms of dialogue manipulation 
(Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004; Van Eemeren, 2010) . For example, as the projection 
over a subset of conceptual dimensions can be considered as a degenerate case of salience 
manipulation (in which one or more dimensions have zero salience), all the conversational 
moves trying to focus on single properties (e.g. exploiting entrainment) can have the effect of 
facilitating a partial agreement on dimensions favorable to the speaker.
Partial agreements are also likely when representations of speakers have different 
dimensions, sharing only some of them. In that case, it appears as unavoidable that meaning 
negotiation will be performed on the shared dimensions, leaving others often implicit and 
thus leading to intrinsically underdetermined agreements. 
While partial agreements emphasize dimensional reduction as a strategy to make an 
agreement possible, the symmetric manipulation, i.e. introducing new dimensions, is of 
course possible. Adding new dimensions might be motivated  by the necessity to search for 
solutions in a broader space, but also respond to other strategic considerations, such as the 
need for an agent to move out of a negotiation space where he has a comparative 
disadvantage. We don't further elaborate  this case here, alhough it is clearly relevant for 
meaning negotiation dynamics and it is a natural development of our approach.
3.3 Metaphoric projection
Students of negotiation often stress the key role that metaphors play in the linguistic 
interaction that lead to negotiated agreements. But how do metaphors affect meaning 
negotiation itself? We suggest that metaphors play a key role in meaning negotiation by 
performing at a same time a selection process over dimensions and a modification of the 
similarity structure of the discourse domain. 
Metaphors are commonly understood as mappings that transfer structure from a source 
domain to a target one. Such mappings act selectively on both the source and target domains 
– they select specific structural aspects of the source and mold the target according to such 
structural aspects – thus only those dimensions of the target which are compatible with the 
target are selected: “the lion Ulysses” emphasizes Ulysses’ courage but hides his condition of 
a castaway in Ogiya. Thus metaphors act by orienting communication and selecting 
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dimensions that may be more or less favorable to the speaker. By suggesting that a storm hit 
the financial markets, a bank manager can move the conversation away from dimensions 
pertaining to his own responsibilities and instead focus on dimensions over which he has no 
control, strengthening his position vis à vis his audience (Rocci, 2009).
At the same time, metaphors shape the distance between different points in conceptual spaces 
by providing context for their interpretation – e.g. by providing contrast classes within which 
distance between elements is modified. This can be illustrated by a more complex example, 
provided by how the Falling Dominoes metaphor, dominating foreign policy in the fifties and 
sixties, created a representation that brought close to each several countries otherwise 
differing in terms of political and military issues; for example, it downplayed those aspects of 
the North Vietnamese position related to nationalism to empasize ideological dimensions 
shared with other countries of the Communist block (McNamara et al. 2007). This led for 
example to significantly downplay the strong distance between North Vietnam and China.  
The Falling Dominoes metaphoric blindfold forced alternative positions in foreign policy into 
a funnel that significantly narrowed  disagreements over possible policies. 
3.4 Non cooperative aspects of meaning negotiation
Until now we have assumed that in meaning negotiation agents will agree on a point which is 
in the efficient set of possible agreements – the standard assumption of cooperative games. 
However, it may be useful to remove this assumption in order to analyze the emergence of 
conversational failures. LiCalzi and Maagli (2013) have analyzed the problem of negotiating 
the categorization of conceptual spaces using the tools of non-cooperative game theory. The 
example of the negotiations of the meaning of “natural forest” from Andersson (1994) is a 
real life illustration of such a situation.
There are two agents and each one of them has a conceptual space that for analytic 
convenience is represented as a circle. Each agent categorizes the conceptual space in two 
convex partitions, Left and Right (the dividing line needs not be a diameter). Agents have an 
incentive to agree on the same categorization of the circle, but if the agreed partition is 
different from their preferred one, they incur a disutility proportional to the area they are 
“giving up” to the agreement – so each rational player strives to minimize her losses. 
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Figure 5 - Two partitions
This simple structure allows singling out two types of initial disagreement. One is the 
“focused” disagreement, where the lines dividing the conceptual spaces for each agent do not 
cross each other – thus the disagreement area is a convex region between the two lines (fig.
6a) The other one is the “widespread disagreement”, where the lines partitioning the 
conceptual spaces for each agent cross each other. This implies that the area of initial 
disagreement is not convex (fig. 6b). As we shall see, these initial conditions of disagreement 
have important implications for the solution reached.
           
 Figure 6 - Focused and widespread disagreement
The case of focused disagreement is simpler and illustrates how the game works. It basically 
happens to be a zero sum game in which what is lost by one player is gained by the other one. 
A simple sequential process gives the first move in the game to one player, mimicking the 
possibility of the first speaker to create an anchor to the establishment of a “common 
ground”. He or she can thus choose where to locate a first point on the circle's circumference. 
The second player can only pick a second point that will determine how the circle is 
partitioned. If both players are trying to minimize their disutility, they will both concede 
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nothing of their original partition, and will stick to one extreme or their dividing line. The 
result is shown in fig. 7a: the player who controls the longest arc (e.g. the one who can 
control the communciation "agenda") loses less than the other (the shaded area represnts the 
initial disagrameent area).
               
                              
Figure 7 - Nash equilibria of the game for the focused and widespread disagreement 
The case of widespread disagreement is more complex /fig 7b). To see it assume (with no 
loss of generality) that the two dividing lines (at the beginning of the game ) go through the 
center of the circle. It would seem reasonable that at the end fo the game the dividing line 
passes through the center, providing an efficient solution. Unfortunately, the Nash equilibrum 
of the game, given the “stubborness “of players in minimizing individually their disutility, 
leads to a communication failure: both players lose some of the potential area of consensus, 
generating a solution that is inefficient — that could be improved if both acted in a more 
collaborative way. Thus, a simple conversation game can show the emergence to a sort of 
“conversational dilemma”, the failure of communication to preserve the pre-existing 
consensus.
4. Discussion
Despite its pervasivness, meaning negotiation is still a rather under-analyzed penomenon. We 
can only speculate on why it is so. Three reasons stand as rather natural. First of all, meaning 
negotiaion presupposes a view of language in which semantic underdetermination plays an 
important role – a view certainly in contrast with the central tenets of classical semantics. 
Furthermore, it presupposes a view of meaning as (at least to some extent) a social, 
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interactive phenomenon, once more violating the strong view of meaning as fundamentally 
independent from the communicative interaction of speakers.
Finally, while the pragmatic tradition concedes a significant role to communicative 
interaction, it still relies heavily on the assumption that language in use is a collaborative 
enterprise (Clark 1996), leaving in the shadow aspects related to conflict between 
communicating agents.
We claim that a geometric approach to meaning (Gärdenfors; 2000, Warglien and Gärdenfors; 
2013; Gärdenfors, 2014) is well equipped to deal with such "anomalous" features of meaning 
negotiation. It allows to explicitly represent underdeterminateness in terms of regions of a 
meaning space. It allows to naturally represent the interactive nature of meaning via 
mappings between different individual meaning spaces. And it can represent conflicting 
preferences for meanings as different locations in such spaces. 
In this chapter we have shortly sketched the outline of a geometric view of meaning 
negotiation. We have shown that such view can inherit important structural elements from 
game theoretic models of bargaining – in particular, for the case where the protagonists have 
overlapping negotiation regions, we have emphasized a parallel to the Nash solution in 
cooperative game theory. When acceptable solutions regions  of the protagonists are disjoint, 
we have presented several types of processes: changes in the salience of dimensions, 
dimensional projections and metaphorical space transformations. None of the latter processes 
are motivated by normative or rationality considerations, but presented as argumentation 
tools that we believe are used in actual situations of conceptual disagreement. 
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